

GAN THE WHIZ KID ADMIRAL TAME THE RUNAWAY C.I.A.

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Stansfield Turner, Annapolis alumni with President Carter, plans to steer the CIA into smooth waters. But leading brigades of idealistic sailors eager to defend their country and whipping an army of alleged hired guns into shape are two very different things indeed

By AL LOWE

Two recent happenings have brought the scandal-ridden CIA back into the headlines, the first bad and the second, hopefully, good. The bad news was the explosive disclosure that the CIA had been paying millions of dollars secretly to Jordan's King Hussein over the past 20 years. The good news is the recent appointment by President Jimmy Carter of formal Admiral Stansfield Turner as the Central Intelligence Agency's new director.

As many Washington insiders see it, the selection of Turner, the Navy's former Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, as the CIA's new boss was an astute move to restore the public's confidence in the nation's political process in general, and the image-tarnished CIA in particular. But whether Turner, despite his exceptional record as a sea-going commander and a top flight administrator, will succeed in reshaping the CIA into an organization that would be, in the President's words, "Not only proper and legal, but also compatible with the attitudes of the American people," remains to be seen.

"Turner's job has got to be an uphill battle all the way," says one of these informed insiders. "In the light of recent in-depth investigations by Frank Church's select Senate committee, a welter of "horror" stories by numerous witnesses have portrayed the CIA as a bureaucratic Frankenstein monster that has not only run amuck throughout the world, but at home as well. In fact, the overwhelming challenge that

Turner presently faces is, not just how to make the agency responsive to the needs of a democratic society, but how to keep the morale-damaged CIA from losing its effectiveness altogether."

Understandably, the grim problems the CIA now faces were seeded in the past. Some thirty years ago, when President Truman requested that members of Congress establish a secret intelligence agency, they responded by passing the Natonal Security Act of 1947. Quite frankly, the political climate of those days cried out for such legislation. World World II had recently come to an end, but the tension-filled cold war had followed right behind. The threat of communism hovered over much of battle-scarred Europe and Asia. Furthermore, the Russians were on the brink of developing a nuclear capability to match our own.

But what Truman envisioned was an agency whose primary mission would be to gather and analyze intelligence information, as opposed to participating in covert or secret operations. Naturally, some information would have had to be gathered secretly, but Truman was convinced that these covert operations could be kept to the barest minimum. In this respect, he was not only off the mark, but had missed by a country mile. Buried in the fine print of the National Security Act was a provision that not only ex-empted the newly-created CIA from standard congressional reviewing procedures, but further allowed the CIA to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

But the interpretation placed upon these innocent enough sounding words provided the agency with a proverbial catch. Gradually, and then more rapidly as the years passed, this vague phrasing not only enabled the CIA to circumvent the law that created the agency but it also provided freedom for the CIA to become increasingly linked with assassinatons, secret deals with Mafia chieftains harrassment and interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and the domestic spying upon countless Americans—including mem-

bers of the Senate and the House of Representatives—to name only some of the horrors and atrocities to have surfaced to this date.

Publicly, the CIA has always denied allegations that would connect it with illegal activities and this is particularly true when it comes to assassinations. But in the face of mounting evidence, these evasive tactics have been wearing thin; the agency's credibility has suffered as a result. In fact, during a press conference in March of 1975, when the congressional investigation of the CIA had hit its stride, former President Ford obliquely confirmed published reports that Colby-the agency's director at the timehad told him privately of CIA support of assassination plots against foreign political figures in the past.

It would be difficult to pinpoint just when the CIA could have decided to get involved in assassinations, but most CIA-watchers say it could have begun in May of 1961 when Rafael Trujillo, the long-reigning dictator of the Dominican Republic, was gunned to death in his 1959 Chevrolet while enroute to keep a rendezvous with his 20-year-old mistress.

One persistent report claims that CIA backing for the assassination came about when Trujillo began showing signs of friendliness toward communist nations and some of their leaders. These reports also state that the CIA provided the weapons to carry out the assassination—a number of fast-firing M-1 carbines that had been disassembled into very small parts and then packed in specially marked cans of food that were shipped to a supermarket in Santo Domingo, and then later turned over to the Dominican conspirators who carried out the murder.

Cuba is another case in point. For years Castro repeatedly accused the CIA of plots against his country and his life. Although the CIA routinely denied these charges, Washington columnist Jack Anderson has cited six assassination attempts of the Cuban leader by infiltrating CIA teams.


Additional support for the existence of such plots comes also from Michael J. Murphy, former Police Commissioner of



New York. When Castro visited the United Nations in the early 60s, a member of the CIA team that occupied a suite in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel told Murphy about a scheme of placing a "loaded" cigar within the Cuban leader's reach. "When he lights it up," the CIA man told Murphy, "the cigar will go off and blow his head off." Murphy reported that he was thoroughly chilled by the story since his job was to protect Castro during his stay in the New York area.

Even more bizarre are those reports linking the CIA with such Mafia figures as gangsters John Roselli and the late Sam Giancana. As reported in a Time magazine story, the CIA was described as having enlisted the aid of the Mafia's hired hit men to knock off Castro either by poisoning or gunfire. But what gives this story further credence is that the FBI learned of the CIA connection—which is now part of the official files-when some FBI men were called in to investigate the burglary of TV comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas hotel room. What shocked the FBI agents was their discovery that the arrested and interrogated "prowlers" had been assigned by the CIA as a payoff favor to Giancana, who was trying to get his hands on information that would break up a romance between Rowan and one of

the gangster's girlfriends.
How the CIA ever became embroiled in assassination plots and cloak-anddagger operations involving under-world figures, is somewhat mindboggling, to say the least. Obviously, there is nothing in the National Security Act of 1947 that provides the agency with the authority to become engaged in such operations on their own. The 1947 law clearly states that any CIA proposal for a secret operation on a large scale—such as the



Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion-would have to be approved by the President or the 40 Committee.

It should also be pointed out that the 40 Committee, consisting of various congressmen, military specialists, the director of the CIA, deputy secretary of defense, and others, has frequently changed names over the past 25 years. It has also been known as the Special Group, the 303 Committee and the 54-12 Group, to name only a few. No matter, its effectiveness as a controlling force over past wide-ranging activities of the CIA has come under severe criticism. Frequently, because of their heavy schedules, the Committee's members would cancel their scheduled weekly meetings. When they did meet-say once or twice a week during the Nixon administration—the minutes taken during the meetings

were intentionally incomplete, and always kept by the only permanent staff member—a CIA man. Worse yet, as reported in their myth-shattering book The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, authors Marchetti and Marks point out that "40 Committee members are men who have been admitted into the very private and exclusive world of covert operations, and they have an overwhelming tendency to agree with whatever is proposed (by the CIA) once they are let in on the secret.

Further confirmation comes from a story that appeared in The Washington Post in the spring of 1973. Reporter Marilyn Berger quoted an intelligence officer about his work with the 40 Committee. "They're like a bunch of schoolboys," he said. "They would listen and their eyes would bug out. I always used to say that I could get \$5 million out of the 40 Committee for a covert operation faster than I could get money for a typewriter out of the

ordinary bureaucracy.

Presidential approval of CIA secret operations has been obtained just as easily by the agency's policy makers over the years. Even President Kennedy was convinced enough to give approval to the Bay of Pigs fiasco not long after his assuming office. When the sorry mess made explosive headlines, Kennedy accepted the blame, but did go on to swallow the CIA's line on expanding the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia. In fact, since the Geneva Accords at that time prohibited foreign troops in Laos, the CIA's heavily pushed plan to establish and operate a private army of its own in Laos was readily agreed to by the White House. In time, this covert operation would become the biggest one in CIA history. Some 35,000 opium-raising Meo and other tribesmen were (Continued on page 37)

Did These Men O.K. Assassi







Allen Dulles, CIA Director, 1953-1961

Richard Helms, CIA Director, 1986-1972

William Colby, CIA Director, 1973-1976

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recruited into the CIA's secret force. Even more astounding is that, for more than ten years, some \$500-million of the taxpayers' money was spent annually to support and supply this rag-tag army—all of it taking 'place without either the knowledge or consent of the American people, or, for that matter, most of Congress as well—a sorry state.

As many Washington experts see it, the toughest part of Turner's new job in running the CIA will have to be directed towards curbing the agency's long freewheeling policy when it comes to interfering with the internal political processes of other countries. In the past, regrettably, when either presidential or 40 Committee approval for CIA actions were obtained, the agency would soon take over the secret operation with little feedback to the approving committee on the grounds that a tight lid on security called for this action. And since those reports sent back were issued, by the agency, to either the president or the 40 Committee, they almost always indicated positive, if not spectacular, gains. But if the operation failed miserably, as was frequently the case, the fact that it was a secret operation, and an illegal one, left only one option: to bury

the facts from the public and hope they wouldn't be unearthed.

But nothing stays buried forever, and the Watergate mess is a case in point. As revealed in the Senate's publicized TV investigation, the CIA had indeed been in on things. The official record has established that some of their agents had assisted the White House "plumbers" who had broken into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in the hopes of gathering information in Nixon's case—an act as illegal as anything. It is even further alleged that Alexander Butterfield, former President Nixon's deputy assistant, the man who shocked the nation and the world with his calm announcement on TV that all of Nixon's official conversations in the White House Oval Office and at the Camp David retreat were on tape, was, in fact, the CIA's White House plant.

C haracteristically, the CIA has always denied having planted operatives in various government departments, but recent evidence published by the House committee that investigated the CIA, has seriously shaken these CIA denials. Congressmen Kasten and Dellums, members of the investigating committee, have stated that a CIA document, reviewed by the committe's staff director, had identified one L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air Force colonel, as the CIA's man in the Pentagon for nine years. In the evidence given by Prouty, he not only admitted that he had acted as a liaison man for the CIA but

that, as far back as 1971, he had learned through Howard Hunt, the convicted Watergate burglar and a former CIA agent, that the CIA's contact in the White House during the Nixon reign was indeed Butterfield.

"It's no secret today," says one Washington insider, "that Nixon and former CIA Director Helms had a falling out when the agency began sidestepping some of the White House ploys to involve the CIA in the Watergate scandal. And when Nixon became angry by the director's refusal to cooperate and fired him, the story making the rounds was that the CIA retaliated by getting Butterfield to direct attention to the incriminating tapes."

Obviously, stories of this kind, confirmed or not, can't help but make anyone wonder about the secretive and mysterious workings of the CIA, and how far it has strayed from its original established charter to a secret one. The very fact that the CIA would be accused of placing 'spies' not only in the Treasury, Commerce, Pentagon and other departments, but in the White House itself, is something its founders back in 1947 would have found unthinkable.

Accordingly, the experts are saying, if Turner is to succeed in turning the CIA around, get it back on a track that will restore its credibility, then something will have to be done to rid the giant agency of some of its built-in conflicts of interest.

For one thing, there is the matter (Continued on page 71)



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known in intelligence parlance as "building assets" that should be considered. Briefly, "building assets" is a fairly standard operational procedure used by the CIA's Clandestine Services when a case officer is assigned to a sensitive overseas station. Once on the job, and operating under a code name with an up-front cover, the case officer will gather "assets", namely information of all sorts, including the cultivation of reliable contacts within the country where the covert station has been established.

Eventually, the information collected. which can take several months or even years, will be passed on to the President and his counselors for possible decision-making policies. But since the operation has been covert, secretive, the reliability of the information, even its very honesty, depends on the agents involved, their assessment of the situation, and the manner in which the sensitive information is recommended to the President by the CIA's planners for final action. Obviously, if the information is faulty but is pushed hard all the same by the CIA's top poeple, the President could be influenced into accepting the agency's recommendations. When this happens, such bad decisions as Kennedy's approval for the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion, or our intervention in Chile's internal affairs during Nixon's rule, can and do take place.

Understandably, the agency's builtin conflict is now readily apparent. When the CIA not only collects the information, but evaluates it, makes the necessary recommendations to assure its approval, and then becomes the operating force to carry out the plan, it is not merely wearing one hat but three. In other words, there are not enough checks and balances in effect to keep the CIA from acting almost as sole judge, jury and executioner. And worse yet, since presidents as well as the members of the aforementioned 40 Committee, relied heavily on the CIA's role, the tendency in the past has been to go along all too quickly with the agency's recommendations with all of the attending risks.

As a first step in remedying this situation, the Senate last year did vote for a 15-member congressional committee to serve as a watchdog group over all of the nation's intelligence community, the CIA included. A prime function of this committee would be to keep a better check on the CIA's multibillion dollar budget, and to learn something as to how these tax dollars are spent and for what purpose. But this in itself may prove to be a mission impossible task. Unlike any other government agency, the CIA has never been required to fully account as to how it spends its money. One example

of how the CIA manages some of its vast amounts of money is the opera-tion of the "Director's Contingency Fund" which provides the director of the CIA, by law, with the right to spend money out of this fund (an amount with an estimated standing of from \$50 to \$100 million) "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds . . .

It is also reliably reported that money in the "Contingency Fund" is frequently used for questionable and unrelated agency purposes. According to one story, when President Johnson visited Uruguay on a state visit, and freely handed out lavish gifts to all and sundry to the point where we had far exceeded the presidential budget for such purposes, a request by the State Department to the CIA was promptly honored and the President's expensive overrun was taken care of out of the CIA's "Contingency Fund".

Accordingly, as stories such as this and others came to light during the recent investigation, and as the Ford presidency wound down toward the end of last year, the scandal-ridden CIA was advised to stay clear of at least two specific types of covert activity: don't assassinate and don't spy on American citizens. Beyond that, things were left in a kind watch-andsee approach until Carter would take office and name the CIA's new director.

Obviously, it's still too early to evaluate how former Admiral Turner is meeting his new challenge as yet, but the problems he faces are formidable. Accustomed to the lack of restraint imposed on it over the past three decades, it is unlikely that the CIA is either overwhelmingly sympathetic or enthusiastic over Carter's expressed views of making the agency's actions both proper and legal, as well as "compatible with the attitudes of the American people."

Unquestionably, intelligence gathering is a required necessity in government today, and when Truman envisioned the CIA he was firmly convinced that an agency of this kind would prevent the repetition of a sneak attack such as the Japanese launched on Pearl Harbor. And he further believed that the CIA would make a vital contribution to national security and the development of meaningful diplomacy in a rapidly changing the world.

But as the recent investigations by both the House and Senate have amply proven, the CIA has not only deviated from its original charter, but it has repeatedly used its enormous power in cloak-and-dagger misdeeds in both shocking and self-serving ways.

Covert action cannot be abandonsays former Under Secretary of State Murphy, "but it should be employed only where clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes and then only after a careful process of high level review." Hopefully, under former Admiral Turner's directorship, these high standards of achievement will be attained. We wish the Admiral good luck in his new undertaking, a full speed

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